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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTINGENT FEESDIVORCE ACTIONS-VALIDITY. Plaintiff attorney was engaged
by defendant to prosecute a divorce action. It was agreed that the
attorney's compensation would be one-third of any alimony the
court might award. Although conceding that the contigent fee contract was void as against public policy, the plaintiff in this suit sought
to recover the reasonable value of his services. The court held that
the entire arrangement was tainted with illegality and hence the
plaintiff could not recover on quantum meruit. McCarthy v. Santangelo, 78 A.2d 240 (Conn. 1951).
At common law, contracts between attorney and client providing
for the payment of contingent fees were not allowed in any type of
action. However, today in ordinary civil cases, they are not only
allowed but are favored in most states, since contingent fees enable
a person without means but with a just cause to employ an attorney
to protect his rights.' But the rule is otherwise in suits for divorce,
separation, and annulment, where contingent fee contracts are almost
universally held void.2 A few cases find such contracts void for
champerty.
More frequently they are held void as against public
policy, since the law favors a lifetime marital status, while a contingent fee contract induces an attorney to secure a divorce rather than
effect a reconciliation. It is said that there is no reason to allow
contingent fees in such cases, since the court can allow reasonable
attorney's fees;5 also, alimony is not assignable and is intended to
provide for the sustenance of the former wife.'
Contingent fee contracts in divorce and annulment cases generally provide that the client cannot settle, dismiss, or compromise the
proceedings before the decree is granted, without the attorney's consent. Such provisions are universally held void as against public
policy, since they would deprive the litigant of control over
the pro7
ceedings and also because the law favors reconciliation.
In cases where an attorney conducts a suit for divorce without
any agreement as to compensation, he is allowed to recover the
reasonable value of his services;' and he may likewise recover where
there exists a voidable contract for compensation in which the party
capable of avoiding has elected to do so.' Under the prevailing rule,
the courts generally treat contingent fee contracts in actions for
divorce or separation as if there were no agreement or as if a voidable

3

See Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907, 910 (1900); Baca v.
Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 190 Pac. 730 (1920).
McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W. 931 (1911); Newman
v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900); Parsons v. Segno, 187
Cal. 260, 201 Pac. 580 (1921); Coleman v. Sisson, 71 Mont. 435, 230
Pac. 582 (1924).
Brindley v. Brindley, 121 Ala. 429, 25 So. 751 (1899); Donaldson v.
Eaton & Estes, 136 Ia. 650, 114 N.W. 19 (1907).
Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128 Ia. 533, 104 N.W. 904 (1905); In re
Slyvester's Estate,- 195 Ia. 1329, 192 N.W. 442 (1923).
McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (1904).
Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886).
See, e.g., Comor v. McGuire, 121 Kan. 820, 250 Pac. 345 (1926); Dan.
nenberg v. Dannenberg, 151 Kan. 600, 100 P.2d 667 (1940).
Hicks v. Stewart & Templeton, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 401, 118 S.W. 206
(1909); Fleming v Phinizy, 35 Ga. App. 792, 134 S.E. 814 (1926).
Crow v. Yokum. 11 Rob. 506 (La. 1845); Overstreet v. Barr, 255 Ky. 82,
72 S.W.2d 1014 (1934).

RECENT CASES
contract had existed, and thus allow recovery on quantum meruit
for the reasonable value of the legal services rendered5
The instant case reaches a result contrary to the weight of authority by a confused application of doctrines of equity and contract.
Although finding that the express contract was void, the court
indicates that its terms are, nevertheless, valid to determine the
services and expenditures for which recovery may be had; and by
some twist of reasoning the illegal taint of the express contract is
transferred so as to defeat an action to recover for the reasonable
value of services rendered in good faith. It is submitted that the
void original contingent fee contract is totally ineffective and should
have no bearing upon plaintiff's right to recover in quantum meruit.'2
Florence A. Vande Bogart
CONTRACTS-THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES-DONEE, CREDITOR, AND INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARIES. Plaintiff leased part
of a building as a storage space for stock. The lessor subsequently
contracted to have an automatic sprinkler system signalling device
installed in the building by the defendant. Because of faulty operation of the system and leakage, the plaintiff's stock was damaged.
Upon suit it was held that plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary as
distinguished from a donee or creditor beneficiary and could not
recover. There was no intent of the contracting parties to recognize
the plaintiff as the primary person to be benefited. Marlboro Shirt
Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 77 A.2d 776 (Md., 1951).
The majority of the courts hold that a third party donee or
creditor beneficiary may sue on a contract made for his benefit,' but
that an incidental beneficiary cannot sue on the contract.'
This
positive rule allowing a third party to sue is based on the proposition
that the law operates on the act of the parties, thus creating the
duty, establishing the privity and implying the promise and obligations on which the action is founded.! The third party's right of
action is not, however, dependent upon the consideration running
directly from him.'
The majority rule has been embodied in the statutes of several
states, including North Dakota,5 and with regard to these statutes,
10 McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N.W. 746 (1904); Klampe v.
Klampe, 137 Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295 (1917); Lynde v. Lynde, 64
N.J. Eq. 736, 52 At. 694 (1902). Contra: Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128
Ia. 533. 104 N.W. 904 (1905).
78 A.2d at 242(1951): "We . . . remand.
for further proceedings
... The plaintiff\ should have an opportunity to present evidence of the
services and expenditures . . . for which the original undertaking did
not provide."
Cf. Baca v. Padilla. 26, N.M. 223, 190 Pac. 730 (1920).
Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 190 Md. 52, 57 A.2d 318
(1948): Williston, Contracts §356 (rev. ed. 1936).
Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938).
3 Packer v. Board of Retirement, 203 P.2d 784 (Cal. 1949), rev'd. on other
grounds, 217 P.2d 660 (1950); Tweddale v. Tweddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93
N.W. 440 (1903); Small v. Schaefer, 24 Md. 143, 159 (1866).
McDonald v. Finseth, 32 N.D. 400, 155 N.W. 863 (1916); In re
McCanna's Estate, 230 Wis. 561, 284 N.W. 502 (1939).
N.D. Rev. Code §9-0204 (1943): "A contract made expressly for the
benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time before the
parties thereto rescind it.'"

